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Yemeni parliamentary election of April 27, 1993,
The marks a watershed for the Arabian Peninsula.
The
for
contest
301
multiparty
constituency-based seats, and
the period of unfettered public debate and discussion that
preceded it, represents the advent of organized mass pol?
itics in a region where political power has long remained
a closely-held family affair. In the weeks after Yemenis
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went to the polls, the regime next door in Saudi Arabia
sent armed police to raid a university campus in Riyadh
and arrest a professor active in a banned human rights
committee. These and other developments in the region
may compel the Clinton administration to weigh its democ?
ratization rhetoric a little more seriously. When a highranking State Department official visited Yemen in midwith a
May, he followed his pro-forma congratulations
cautionary note: "I don't think you should look on what you
do here as a model for anyone else to follow."1
Yemen's commitment to elections accompanied the uni?
fication agreement between Ali Abdallah Salih, president
of the (North) Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and Ali Salim
al-Bayd, leader of the ruling party in the (South) People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Following for?
mal unification on May 22,1990, a five-member Presidential
Council headed by Salih held executive power, and the two
former parliaments were combined in a unified Chamber
of Deputies. Under a constitution approved by national
referendum in May 1991, political parties organized open?
ly and most restrictions on association, expression and
movement were lifted. The 1991 referendum specified that
the elections be held within 30 months of unification, but
a combination of technical problems, procrastination and
conflicts between "Ali and Ali" (Salih and al-Bayd) post?
poned polling beyond the November 1992 deadline.
In the months before April, a multiparty Supreme
Elections Committee (SEC) drew up 301 districts and estab?
lished procedures for voter and candidate registration, a
10-day campaign period, write-in ballots, and counting
procedures.2 In early 1993, 2.7 million adults (including
77 percent of eligible males and 15 percent of eligible
females) registered to vote. Some 4,800 candidates regis?
tered, the majority of them independents.3 More than 3,600,
including 50 women, stayed in the campaign until the end.
Political

Space

How did it happen that two erstwhile dictators presided
over relatively fair, peaceful multiparty elections?
The answer lies mainly in the conditions that led to uni?
fication. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet
assistance so essential to the PDRY's survival, and reduced
Western and Gulf interests in sustaining inter-Yemeni
tensions. Dissidents from each polity had sought refuge in
the others' capital, and most independent political move?
ments, organizations and unions were committed to unity.
Planners looked to recent oil discoveries along their com?
mon frontier to bring in foreign investment and exchange.
In short, realizing that in order to maintain power they
would have to share power, Ali and Ali agreed not only to
merge their polities but to open up the process to wider
participation.4
The process had some unique facilitating features.
Unlike other "democratizing" systems, Yemen inherited
two ruling parties that shared power in a delicate, often
tense balance during the transitional period, each retain?
ing control of its former military and security apparatusMiddle East Report ? November-December

1993

es. The General People's Congress (GPC) was founded by
Ali Abdallah Salih in the 1980s as an Egyptian-style amal?
gam of all political tendencies within Salih's regime. Ali
Salim al-Bayd's Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), born during
South Yemen's anti-colonial struggle and divided between
old-guard Leninists and a growing number of social democ?
rats, was better organized and had a more coherent ide?
ology than the GPC.
This rough two-party equilibrium created space for other
Isiah (Reform)
political organizations. The Saudi-backed
between Shaikh
Party is a marriage of convenience
Abdallah al-Ahmar, the head of the powerful Hashid con?
Muslim Brotherhood.
federation, and the urban-based
In 1991, the Isiah had led an unsuccessful boycott of the
1991 constitutional referendum because the shari'a is stip?
ulated simply as "the main" rather than "the only" source
of legislation. The Iraqi-leaning
Yemeni Ba'th is much
smaller in numbers, but also wields some influence in trib?
al and military circles through its charismatic leader,
Mujahid Abu Shuarib.5 The most important among some
40 other parties are three Nasirist factions; a sayyid* group
known as al-Haq (Right); Omar al-Jawi's progressive
Unionist Party; and the League of the Sons of Yemen led
by Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri. Some smaller parties, unable
to field a full slate and obtain state campaign financing,
ran candidates as "independents."
Despite instances of disorder and violence, and scores
of complaints, the outcome indicated a genuine contest.
The GPC won 123 constituencies;
Isiah came in second
with 62 seats, mostly from its tribal rather than its Islamist
wing; the YSP took 57, mostly in the former PDRY; inde?
pendents won 47; the Ba'th seven; three Nasirist parties
each gained one seat; al-Haq won two, and one district's
election was postponed.6 The YSP claimed that in addition
to 57 party members, 13 independent socialists won with
its support, and an additional 17 genuinely independent
deputies-elect share its vision of the future.7 Some spec?
ulated that Isiah, which declined to estimate its unofficial
sympathizers, had 30 supporters who won under the GPC
banner, plus three independents. By any count, the arith?
metic mandated a coalition government.8
Domestic

Pressures

Arab leaders have promised free elections in the past and
not delivered. What made Salih and al-Bayd?neither
of
whose personal histories indicates a commitment to polit?
ical liberalism?follow
through? The answer lies in soci?
etal pressures which took different forms: mass confer?
ences, strikes, demonstrations,
political organizations,
press commentaries, academic symposia and maqiyal or
"salons."
Prior to the elections, a series of mass conferences pro?
vided outlets for articulate opposition elements. A nineday Talahum (Cohesion) Conference in December 1991,
gathered some 10,000 men; although its banner was the
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Bakil tribal confederation, urban intellectuals were among
the organizers and authors of a 33-point resolution calling
forjudicial independence, strengthening of representative
parliamentary and local bodies, fiscal restraint and man?
agement, revitalization of agricultural and services.cooperatives, an independent media, environmental protec?
time-frame,
tion, free elections within the mandated
peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts, and other reforms.9
Some seven other tribe-based but civic-oriented mass con?
ferences in 1992 each issued written demands for the
rule of law, pluralism, economic development and local
autonomy. The Saba' (Sheba) Conference of Bakil and
Madhaj tribes elected a council of trustees, a council of
social reform, and follow-up committees to ensure insti?
tutional continuity.
This activity culminated with a national conference of
representatives of the smaller center and left parties and
political organizations, led by Omar al-Jawi. This time,
the two ruling parties strove to delay, discourage, coopt
and eventually offset what promised to be a major event
and by
counter-conference
by holding a simultaneous
San'a
the
of
from
the
ouster
their
arranging
opponents
Cultural Center to the local Sheraton. Well-publicized in
the opposition press but ignored by the official media,
the center-left conference criticized delayed preparations
for the elections and the government's reckless printing of
money, and proposed a code of political conduct for polit?
ical parties.10 The Ta'iz Conference in November 1992,
headed by al-Jifri, went even further in attracting facul?
ty, journalists and professionals; challenging Ta'iz's gov?
ernor; constituting steering and work councils; and artic?
ulating explicit demands for civic and human rights, local
elections, and improved local services.11 Not to be outdone,
the Isiah organized
a 4,000-strong
Unity and Peace
Conference in December under the slogan "The Quran and
the Sunna Supersede the Constitution and the Law."12
These conferences, both tribal and urban-based, involv?
ing tens of thousands of people, were among the transition
period's most important political developments. In response,
the regime felt compelled to adopt its own code of politi?
cal conduct, dismiss the Ta'iz governor, accept the princi?
ple of local elections, and adopt a rhetoric of electoral rights.
There were also several outbursts of popular frustra?
tion, most notably in December 1992. Outrage with the
collapse ofthe value of the riyal, inadequate services, mount?
ing unemployment,
government corruption and post?
of
the
elections
ponement
erupted in mass demonstrations
against both the state and private merchants in all major
cities. Along with strikes and threatened strikes by groups
ranging from garbage collectors to judges, the near-riots
reminded the government of the power of popular wrath.
On a smaller scale but a more institutionalized basis,
numerous independent political organizations emerged.
The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and
Liberties, established by liberal university professors, ini?
tiated the National Committee for Free Elections (NCFE),
in turn spurring the formation of other electoral NGOs.
Although they failed on their own terms to guarantee the

integrity of the balloting process, they did perform a mod?
est watchdog function and met again after the elections to
prepare for the next round. Syndicates, charities and inter?
est groups have been increasingly active.
The press is also significant within the political arena.
More than 100 partisan and independent newspapers and
mostly founded since 1990, covered these
magazines,
events. Although the government daily, Al-Thawra, and
state-run television and radio tend to dominate news cov?
erage, a number of opposition weeklies have a strong read?
ership among the literate, urban, politically active popu?
lation: Sawt al-(Ummal (Voice of the Workers), based in
Aden, has the largest circulation of any paper. Party organs,
includingRaay, Al-Tashih, Al-Sahwa and others, provide
critical commentary and information about opposition con?
ferences and independent organizations. There has emerged
a press corps of scores of men and several dozen women
who more and more approximate a fourth estate, conducting
interviews, attending parliament, asking critical questions
at press conferences, testing the limits of press law and
defending one another against lawsuits.13
Related to the mass conferences, political organizing
and press activity was a trend toward academic symposia
on topics such as the constitutional amendments, admin?
istrative decentralization, municipal services, and the cam?
paign experience of women candidates. Typically invit?
ing members of each party and independent specialists,
such symposia, virtually unheard of in the old North or
South Yemen, provided fora for discussion, debate and
refinement of ideas which were then reported in the oppo?
sition press.
More frequent and informal is an updated variation
on the male qat session, or maqiyal, which approximates
the "salons" of 19th-century Europe.14 Nowadays these
customarily informal social gatherings may elect a chair,
select a topic, establish rules of order, and hold organized
political discussion on topics ranging from relations with
the Gulf to women's rights to exchange rate policy.
Collectively, these civic activities applied consider?
able pressure on the regime to fulfill its promises, abide by
a code of conduct, address its critics and respect political
pluralism. Several Yemeni intellectuals have criticized
international observers and reporters for presenting an
unduly positive picture of the electoral experience, and
many participants in the conferences and seminars are
quite cynical about their own influence, insisting that they
from the political process. By
have been marginalized
the same token, it is difficult to imagine the events of the
past year taking place had they been passive.
External

Involvement

Rumors in San'a had the US playing a major if covert
role in organizing the elections and the post-electoral com?
promise. There is scant evidence, though, of Western pres?
sure for political liberalization in Arabia. Although USYemeni relations seemed poised to improve immediately
after unification in May 1990, they deteriorated after Iraq's
Middle East Report ? November-December
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invasion of Kuwait because, in the words of US Ambassador
Arthur Hughes, "San'a wanted to maintain normal rela?
tions with Baghdad."15 American aid, never monetarily
significant, was slashed from $30 million to $3 million, and
Agency for International Development (AID) direct-hire
staff reduced from 19 to four or five.
Unity and electoral democracy have never been high
on the US agenda for the Arabian Peninsula. Washington
habitually defers to Saudi perceptions. James Schelsinger,
former CIA director and secretary of defense and a man
with some experience in setting the US strategic agenda in
the Middle East, asked recently "whether we seriously desire
or prescribe democracy as the proper form of government
for other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posed
in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the
institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no...."16
Once elections were scheduled, though, Washington felt
obliged to make a show of support. An embassy memo?
randum in April 1993 claimed that "We have shaped near?
ly every program to strengthen Yemen's emerging demo?
cratic institutions and to underline US support for this
development...."17 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
David Mack arrived in early May to say that he was
"instructed to congratulate the Yemeni people and gov?
ernment."18
Accordingly, with $480,000 (mostly for American staff
and their travel expenses), AID funded the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National
Middle East Report ? November-December

1993

Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and
the International Republican Institute (IRI) to assist elec?
tion officials and observers.19 Hastily arranged, these pro?
jects had minimal effect. IFES was still conducting train?
ing on the eve of the elections, using a syllabus their own
IRI's team of inter?
team leader considered inadequate.
national observers included few Arabic speakers. Even the
US Republicans
could not overcome neighboring Arab
states' reluctance to have their citizens observe the process.
The IRI team included one person from the United Arab
Emirates and a Bahraini who arrived on a tourist visa.
NDI's plan to organize volunteer Yemeni monitors for each
of the 7,000 polling stations was a fiasco, and illustrated
the NDI's lack of familiarity with an Arab environment.20
US press coverage was favorable, as were the reports
observer groups. But
of these US and international
reaction
was
Washington's
qualified by an obvious concern
that pluralism not spread to other parts of the Peninsula.
The State Department's Mack emphasized that "one elec?
tion does not make a democracy" and that US support is
more likely to consist of corporate investments than restored
levels of aid. While holding that Yemen would have to take
further steps toward democracy before satisfying US stan?
dards, and agreeing that countries have the right to choose
the style of democracy that best suits their internal envi?
ronments, Mack then cited Kuwait's more controlled, lim?
poll last August as a precedent for
ited-participation
Yemen!21

US and Gulf pressures may have been a factor in
Yemen's
of a new foreign minister,
appointment
Muhammad
who publicly disavowed
Salim Basindwa,
Yemen's Gulf war stance and spent much of his time away
from the fray courting a rapprochement
with the Gulf
monarchies.22 Ambassador Hughes announced a modest
$1.7 million increase in US assistance, but made it clear
that improved Yemeni relations with the Gulf are more
important to Washington than civil rights and political
pluralism.23
Post-Election

Developments

In the new parliament's first session, Shaikh Abdallah alAhmar, the Isiah leader, won the speakership with 223
votes. Balloting for three deputy speakers returned one
each from GPC, Ba'th and YSP. A package of constitutional
amendments put immediately to the Chamber proposed
replacing the existing five-man Presidential Council, tech?
nically selected by the Chamber, with a US-style two-term
president and vice president; creating an upper house (a
Consultative Council) with equal representation for each
governorate; and mandating elections for the local coun?
cils, district administrators and governors.24 An Islah-proposed amendment would require that all Yemeni laws
conform to shari'a.
Pending discussion of these amendments, parliament
extended the term of the transition Presidential Council,
with three Congress members and two Socialists, through
October. Prime Minister Abu Bakr al-Attas of the YSP,
asked to form the new government, appointed 15 minis?
ters from the GPC, eight Socialists, six from Isiah, and Abu
Shuarib of the Ba'th.25 Only a third of these 30 ministers
were new.
A general eight-point government program, whose most
sensitive proposal concerned the long-delayed merger of
the two armies, was put to parliament for a vote of confi?
dence in early July.26 But just when bargaining and com?
promises seemed to produce a workable coalition, the
deputies balked. For more than a week in late July and
early August, al-Ahmar pounded his gavel in a vain attempt
to restore order as a raucous debate raged over the pro?
gram, the constitutional amendments, the composition
of the Presidential Council, and unification of the armed
forces. After an alternative program drafted by parlia?
mentary committee was presented, 260 deputies demand?
ed to address the floor, threatening to drag on the debate
endlessly. Finally a vote of confidence on the program
passed on the implicit premise that the substance of the
debate would be deferred to deliberations on the consti?
tutional amendments package. As the Chamber went into
recess in early August, the Isiah and the Socialists were
each threatening to withdraw from the coalition unless
their respective demands for shari'a law and the vice pres?
idency were met.
When parliament reconvened in September, a threeparty committee was formed to discuss the proposed con?
stitutional amendments, now revised to concentrate more

power in the hands of the chief executive. Critics, includ?
ing the newly-formed opposition coalition of five small par?
ties, many Socialists, and independent intellectuals, con?
tended that the current constitution has not yet been
implemented, and that the continuing focus on the com?
position of government institutions only served to divert
attention away from a deepening economic crisis which
promises to grow more acute as a World Bank-IMF struc?
tural adjustment program is put into effect. Popular rat?
ification of the political establishment has not diminished
profound disagreements over basic issues of governance
and accountability,
and more than a few thoughtful
Yemenis fear that even the startling accomplishments of
the last several years?unification
and participatory pol?
vulnerable to hostile forces in the country
itics?remain
?
and in the region.
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